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Introduction 
Agricultural production systems are exposed to adverse climatic hazards such as drought. 
Drought spells can infringe severe impacts in most vulnerable farms. It is well known 
that uninsured exposure exacerbates income inequality in farming systems (Rosenzweig 
and Binswager, 1986) and eventually results in welfare losses for rural families (Dercon, 
2003). The advantages of farmers who have access to financial tools have been widely 
acknowledged (Sen, 1966). However, high administrative costs of traditional insurance 
hinder small farmers’ access to risk management tools. The existence of moral hazard 
and systemic risk prevents the implementation of traditional insurance programs to 
address the risk of drought in rural areas (Goodwin, 2001). 
In particular, the vulnerability of grazing livestock systems with close dependence on 
silvo-pastoral systems highlights the need for tools to evaluate and mitigate the adverse 
impacts of drought. Drought risk requires effective management and new technologies 
may help to overcome the limitations of traditional tools. An example that has attracted 
considerable interest over the last decade is the development of vegetation indices based 
on satellite images as an indicator of drought which are being used to provide index 
insurance in farming activities.  
One of the main problems in insurance design relates to obtaining quality data to 
calculate the risk premium. In rural areas where there are no historical records of 
production data or adverse events such as drought and its impact on production, remote 
sensing helps to overcome this problem and generates information from these areas that 
otherwise would be impossible or too expensive to obtain. 
Weather index insurance is an innovative financial instrument that allows policyholders 
to receive compensation in events triggered by a publicly observable index that is highly 
correlated with drought impact while traditional insurance is based on observed 
individual losses. 
Index insurance has attracted considerable interest from various governments and 
organizations as a management tool against large covariate risks that tend to affect a 
geographical area, such as drought events(World Bank 2008, FAO, 2005, OECD, 2009a). 
During last decade, an active research agenda has focused on its potential to reduce costs 
and eliminate some of the barriers of traditional insurance such as moral hazard, adverse 
selection or lack of individual historical records among others.   
Potential limitations have also been explored. Basis risk has been identified in the 
literature as one of the main problems of indexed insurance (Barnett and Mahul, 2007; 
Xu et to 2007; Deng et al. 2008; Senholz, 2009; Barnett, 2004, Barrett et al, 2007; among 
others). Basis risk refers to the imperfect correlation between the index and the losses 
experienced by the insured and implies that the instrument does not offer adequate 
protection against adverse events (Barnett, 2004), i.e. the possibility that the insured 
person experiences a loss and does not receive compensation or, conversely, that the 
insured does not suffer a drought impact but receive compensation. Gine et al (2007) and 
Rowley et (2007) shows that the correlation between the index and actual drought losses 
increases during severe droughts, reducing basis risk. 
Rangeland insurance contract compensates farmers for the increased cost for 
supplemental feeding due to deficit of pastures when a drought spell sets in. Spain, 
Canada and the USA are promoting the use of index insurance, particularly for drought 
risk management in grazing lands (Bielza et al, 2008). Since 2007, USA has started an 
insurance program for pasture and forage indexed intending to offer drought risk 
protection in a potential area of 450 million acres (USDA, 2008). Spain has led, since 
2001, a pioneering experience for drought insurance in pastures using a vegetation index 
derived from satellite images (Burgaz, 2008). 
The aim of this paper is analyze the potential of index based insurance to address drought 
risks in grazing lands within the Araucanía Region. We estimate the actuarially fair risk 
premium and analyze different contract designs. In particular, we analyze risk premium 
and basis risks for moderate and extreme drought hazards.  
Literature review 
In 1949, Halcrow already mentioned the potential of index insurance to address systemic 
risk in vulnerable areas and identified certain areas of research to be developed. Primer 
works and experiences dealt with yield index insurance where payments are triggered 
based on the evolution of a regional or area yield index. However, recent interest in index 
insurance has run parallel to development and advances in meteorological stations and 
satellite observation techniques. In particular, latest advances have resulted in the 
development of indices, such as the normalized difference vegetation index (NDVI) and 
others, with considerably higher resolution and increased frequency and timely data 
availability.  
Index insurance is in this case designed to provide financial compensation when the 
Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) for a certain period of days, is below a 
threshold that indicates drought impact (e.g. a decrease in the availability of grass for 
animal feed). Therefore, assessment of damage is done through vegetation indices 
derived from satellite images by homogeneous geographic areas. 
It is important to note the increasing number of experiences that are being implemented 
in different countries. Barnett and Mahul (2007) and OECD (2009b) cite experiences 
with index insurance in Mexico, Peru and India and drivers of drought index insurance in 
Ukraine, Malawi, Ethiopia, China, Tanzania, Nicaragua, Thailand, Kazakhstan, Senegal 
and Morocco , among others. 
The expectations generated by the potential of index insurance to deal with systemic risks 
have led to an emerging and active body of scientific literature in recent years. Most of 
these investigations have focused on the potential advantages of index insurance as 
compared to traditional crop insurance. Skees (2008) points out simple information 
requirements, eliminating the costs of inspection, reducing traditional problems of moral 
hazard and adverse selection, low administration costs, standardized and transparent 
structure, and ease of reinsurance. Similarly, Barnett and Mahul (2007) emphasize that 
the index insurance does not require classification of the insured individual risk exposure. 
In the same vein, the OECD (2009a) mentioned among the main advantages of 
immediate availability of the funds once triggered adverse events and low administration 
costs if the solution is properly configured.  
On the other hand, most authors point out that main limitation for index insurance is 
related to basis risk (Barnett and Mahul, 2007, Xu et al 2007, Deng et al, 2008; Senholz, 
2009, Barnett, 2004, Barrett et al, 2007, among others). OECD (2009b) noted that the 
successful implementation of index insurance depends on the identification of an 
appropriate index. This index should be highly correlated with actual loss and provide a 
reliable and consistent measure. 
To minimize basis risk, Deng et al (2008) suggest the development of more sophisticated 
indices, based on the interaction of different variables. However, Vedenov and Barnett 
(2004) warn that optimal index insurance may require complicated combinations of 
weather variables to achieve reasonable accommodation between climate and 
performance. Other authors point out that index insurance should be offered only in areas 
where spatially correlated climate variable is the main cause of losses (Barnett and 
Mahul, 2007). 
Evaluation of recent experiences suggest that implementation of index insurance requires 
an appropriate legal and institutional framework that not only addresses the proper 
regulation of insurance sales, but also the execution of contracts. Similarly, there must be 
objectivity, reliability and thoroughness in the measurement of the index (Skees, 2008, 
Barnett and Mahul, 2007). Similarly, Skees (2008) notes the problems associated with 
marketing the product and emphasizes the importance of providing training and 
information assurance system to farmers. 
Despite its limitations several authors suggest that, index insurance is the most 
appropriate risk management tool when there are notorious difficulties in measuring 
performance, as is the case of grazing lands (Barnett, 2004). In a rangeland insurance 
program, the use of traditional approaches to the measure grass yield per growing season 
is a problem also mentioned by other authors such as Rowley (2002) and Zhou (2007). 
Methodological Framework 
In this section we develop an actuarial model estimate the fair risk premium for an index 
insurance contract based on satellite vegetation index for both severe and moderate 
triggering index. Further, we evaluate and analyze basis risk under both selected 
threshold indexes. 
We develop a theoretical framework that extends the methodology proposed by Miranda 
(1991) for crop yield index insurance to a multi-period model that characterizes extensive 
livestock systems and evaluates drought risks on grasslands.  
We define area vegetation index, 
cty
~ , as the average of all pixels located within a given 
zone c. In addition, it is assumed that farm pasture growth in period t is perfectly captured 
by the evolution of the pixel index 
ity
~ where it is located. 
The equation relating drought farm losses and area vegetation index is as follows: 
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We assume that pastures growth in farm i is a random variable influenced both by 
endogenous and exogenous growing conditions. Therefore, equation (1) establishes that 
vegetation index in pixel i depends both on systemic and non systemic components. The 
systemic component )~( ctctit y   is correlated with the zone vegetation index while non-
systemic component it
~
is only dependent on endogenous farm characteristics. 
The definition of the index insurance contract provides compensation in terms of daily 
cost due to feed supplement when drought reduces pasture availability. The compensation 
is triggered when zone vegetation index cty
~ falls below the critical threshold
ctyct
k  . 
According to this the farmer receives an annual compensation as stated in equation (2): 
 ),,;~(~ kygcx ctctct     (2) 
Where ),,;~( kyg ctctct   is defined as a binary random variable 
1),,;~( kyg ctctct    si ctctct ky  
~  (3a) 
0),,;~( kyg ctctct    si ctctct ky  
~  (3b) 
Substituting equation (1) in equation (3a) and (3b) and arranging terms, the condition that 
triggers compensation payment can be rewritten as: 
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Based on these equations, compensation payment for each farm is determined by the 
following equations: 
1),,;~( kyg ctctct   ;  si itctititit ky 
~~    (5a) 
0),,;~( kyg ctctct   ;  si itctititit ky 
~~    (5b) 
Finally, the fair risk premium is defined as the expected value of annual compensation as 
expressed by the following equation: 
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Considering the conditions established in equations (5a) and (5b), we can rewrite the fair 
risk premium as: 
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Equation (7) shows that basis risk or probability of suffering a drought that is not 
detected by the terms of the contract is determined by systemic and non-systemic 
component. The systemic component depends on the selected index threshold and the 
correlation coefficient between area vegetation index and pixel vegetation index. 
This framework for designing and setting the premium shows the relevance of certain 
elements of the contract: the selection of index, the definition of homogeneous areas and 
the triggering index threshold level.  
In particular, we want to analyse the influence of the triggering index threshold in basis 
risk. This may be a key issue if correlation is not constant but increases for severe 
drought spells. This is, if correlation is higher at the left tail of the distribution, basic 
insurance coverage to address severe droughts impacts will exhibit low basis risk. 
There is an inherent basis risk in index insurance that is defined as the probability of 
experiencing losses that may not be detected by the contract. However, basis risk also 
comprises the possibility of receiving an indemnity without experiencing drought 
impacts. 
This matrix classifies all possible situations in index insurance contracts: 
 
 Drought 
iitit ky  
~  
Non-drought 
iitit ky  
~  
Compensation 
cctct ky  
~  
TRUE POSITIVE 
)~/~( cctctitit kyikyP    
FALSE POSITIVE 
)~/~( cctctitit kyikyP    
No 
compensation 
cctct ky  
~  
FALSE NEGATIVE 
)~/~( cctctitit kyikyP    
TRUE NEGATIVE 
)~/~( cctctitit kyikyP    
According to the above classification we can apply Bayes therorem to measure two types 
of basis risk. This is what we want to know: (i) which is the probability of not receiving a 
compensation when the farmer experiences a drought?, and (ii) which is the probability 
of being compensated when the farmer does not experience a drought? 
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In the next section an empirical application is developed to analyze the potential of index 
insurance in Chilean grazing ecosystems. We estimate the fair risk premium and evaluate 
basis risk under regional index insurance for both severe and moderate triggering index.  
Our hypothesis is that basis risk decreases when a lower triggering index is used. In order 
to test this hypothesis we estimate the above probability matrix and analyze the two 
components of basis risk as defined in (8) and (9) for a low and a high triggering indexes. 
Empirical application 
The empirical application is based on Normalized Differential Vegetation Index (NDVI) 
time series for the Araucanía Region in Chile. NDVI satellite images were captured by 
the AVHRR sensor NOAA with a resolution of 0.5 km. 
The database
1
 contains Monthly Maximum Value Composite NDVI measured from 1981 
to 1994 in the Araucanía Region. The STATA software has been used for data statistical 
analysis. 
                                                   
1
 The University of New Hampshire, EOS-WEBSTER Earth Science Information Partner (ESIP), is the 
data distributor for this dataset 
The Araucanía Region concentrates 30% farms in the country and accounts for an 
important bovine livestock. Most frequent socio-economic farm characteristics are family 
farms with low incomes and limited access to technology and financial tools. 
Table 1. Farming systems in the Araucanía Region 
Region farms bovine sheep goats grasslands 
  n° % n° % n° % n° % ha % 
La Araucanía 37.641 30,0 668.140 18,0 277.884 7,1 50.810 7,1 614.852,90 5,5 
Country 125.421 100,0 3.719.709 100,0 3.889.389 100,0 715.824 100,0 11.115.846 100,0 
Source: INE - Chile, 2007 
The first step was to select appropriate pixels according to land use, ten pixels where 
found with relevant grassland uses. The second step was to define the homogeneous area. 
A regional administrative unit was found too heterogeneous and a pixel correlation 
matrix was developed in order to identify homogeneous areas. 
The third step relates to the definition of the triggering thresholds. Index thresholds were 
defined following the Spanish insurance design to address drought in grazing lands (see 
eq. 3a and 3b). The calculation of thresholds considered monthly average vegetation 
index less k times the standard deviation. Two alternative options are established: k=0,7 
offering a moderate drought risk coverage and k= 1,5 that only cover more severe 
drought risks. 
Given that the available time series was not very long, Burn analysis was preferred to 
Montecarlo method in order to develop the actuarial model and estimate the fair 
insurance premium. Feed costs are estimated using forage prices in Chile and insurance 
premium are estimated in €/bovine head. 
Results and concluding remarks 
The coefficient correlation matrix obtained for the different pixels was used to define two 
different clusters and improve the correlation of index based insurance as compared to a 
unique regional index contract ( 83,0,79,0 21  clustercluster   and )62,0region  
 
 Figure 1. Scatter plots NDVI pixel vs NDVI cluster 
Table 2 illustrates that the probability of suffering a drought sharply increases when 
considering moderate drought coverage (k=0,7) as compared to severe drought coverage 
(k=1,5).  
Probabilities are quite similar at the different locations or pixels for moderate drought 
coverage. However, more important differences arise for a severe drought coverage 
(k=1,5). The probability of drought at pixel 4 more than doubles the probability at pixel 7 
when a severe drought threshold is considered. 
Table 2.  Probability of moderate and severe drought at each location 
Location 
or Pixel 
 
Threshold k= 0,7 
Moderate Drought 
)7,0~(
tiitit
yP    
Threshold k= 1,5 
Severe drought 
)5,1~(
tiitit
yP    
1 37 9 
2 35 12 
3 38 10 
4 31 13 
5 34 8 
6 35 9 
7 36 6 
8 34 9 
9 36 9 
 
This may be inherent to the triggering index structure. While in some index-based 
drought programs the index threshold is established as a  given percentage of the average 
value, in this empirical application we have followed the guidelines established in the 
Spanish insurance contract which is based in k deviations from the average. One 
characteristic of this threshold structure is that if the NDVI follows a normal probability 
distribution, such a contract design translates into similar risk premiums. In consequence, 
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even at different locations farmers will pay similar risk premiums for the same threshold 
coverage. 
This does not happen when the probability distribution function is asymmetric. It has to 
be noted in this case that asymmetries are more pronounced at the tail of the index 
probability distribution function and this explains why significant differences in risk 
premiums arise between different locations when a severe drought coverage or a more 
stringent threshold is used.   
Table 3 below describes the two components of basis risk under moderate and severe 
triggering thresholds (k=0,7 and k=1,5). Type I basis risk is defined as the probability of 
receiving no compensation while type II basis risk refers to the probability of being for 
compensation when the farmer does not suffer drought losses. When drought coverage is 
reduced, type II basis risk improves for all locations while type I gets worst in all 
locations except one.  
Our results show that basis risk does not necessarily reduce when only severe drought 
coverage (k=1,5) is offered. These results may be intuitively confirmed when looking at 
the scatter plots for both cluster which reveal that contrary to our hypothesis correlation 
may be lower at the left tail (Figure 1). 
Table 3. Basis risk at each location (pixel) 
 Location 
of pixel 
Probability of no compensation when 
farmer experiences a drought (eq. 8) 
Probability of compensation when there are 
no droughts impacts in the farm (eq. 9) 
  Threshold k=0,7 Threshold k=1,5 Threshold k=0,7 Threshold k=1,5 
1 0,378 0,222 0,093 0,044 
2 0,200 0,583 0,064 0,023 
3 0,289 0,500 0,075 0,022 
4 0,290 0,308 0,097 0,031 
5 0,324 0,500 0,091 0,066 
6 0,229 0,333 0,073 0,015 
7 0,167 0,333 0,046 0,029 
8 0,294 0,444 0,100 0,022 
9 0,250 0,333 0,074 0,015 
Our results are not conclusive and caution has to be taken in the selection of the 
appropriate index as it has an important impact in basis risk. Further analyses of the 
relation between contract design and basis risk is a promising area of research that may 
render an important social utility for most vulnerable farming systems. 
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